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ABSTRACT
As well  as  addressing  the  Basel  Committee's  proposals  to  strengthen  global  capital  and 
liquidity regulations, this paper also considers several reasons why information disclosure  
should be encouraged. These include the fact that imperfect information is considered to be a 
cause  of  market  failure  which  “reduces  the  maximisation  potential  of  regulatory  
competition”, and also because disclosure requirements would contribute to the reduction of  
risks which could be generated when granting reduced capital level rewards to banks who 
may have poor management systems. Furthermore it draws attention to the need for greater  
measures aimed at consolidating regulation within (and also extending regulation to) the  
securities markets – given the fact that „the globalisation of financial markets has made it  
possible  for  investors  and  capital  seeking  companies  to  switch  to  lightly  regulated  or  
completely unregulated markets.“
Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector: Proposals to 
Strengthen Global Capital and Liquidity Regulations
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives namely:2
 - „To help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system. This 
would  be  facilitated  where  international  banking  organisations  were  encouraged  to 
supplement their capital positions.
 - To mitigate competitive inequalities“
The framework was not only oriented towards increasing the sensitivity of regulatory capital 
differences in risk profiles which exist within banking organisations, but was also aimed at 
discouraging the retention of liquid, low risk assets.3 Furthermore, it was designed to take into 
express consideration, off balance sheet exposures when assessments of capital adequacy are 
undertaken.4
Ten years following the conclusion of the agreement on the 1988 Accord, a Working Party 
was established to evaluate the impact and achievements of the Basel Accord. Two principal 
issues which were taken into consideration by the Working Party were:5 Firstly, whether some 
banks have been encouraged to hold higher capital ratios than would have been the case if the 
adoption of fixed minimum capital requirements had not occurred and, whether an increase in 
capital or reduction of lending has resulted in any increase in ratios. Secondly, an evaluation 
of the impact of fixed capital requirements on reduced risk taking by banks, in relation to 
capital, was also to be undertaken.
In response to the first issue, relating to whether an introduction of fixed minimum capital 
requirements has led to banks maintaining higher capital  ratios,  some studies which were 
undertaken,  revealed  that  capital  standards,  when  strictly  adhered  to,  compelled  weakly 
capitalised banks to consolidate their capital ratios.6 In response to whether banks adjusted 
their capital ratios to comply with requirements through an increase in capital or a reduction 
of risk-weighted assets, research revealed that banks responded to pressures stemming from 
capital ratios, in a way which they perceived to be most cost effective.7 Results obtained in 
response  to  an  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  capital  requirements  on  risk  taking  were 
1 Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen, Teaching Associate, Oxford 
Brookes University, Oxford.
2„Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basle Accord“ Basle Committee on Banking 




6Ibid at page 2
7Ibid at page 3
inconclusive.8 The data available for purposes of measuring bank risk taking, were not only 
limited, but also complicated the task of making an evaluation thereof.9
Other issues which were difficult to evaluate included whether an introduction of minimum 
capital  requirements  for  banks  were  detrimental  to  their  competitiveness  and whether  the 
Basel  Accord  facilitated  competitive  inequalities  amongst  banks.10 These  evaluative 
difficulties, respectively, were attributed firstly, to the fact that “long term competitiveness of 
banking” depends on a variety of factors – most of which are not connected to regulation and 
secondly,  to the available evidence at the time – which was inconclusive – and hence, not 
sufficiently persuasive.11
I. Amendments to the 1988 Accord
The First Consultative Paper – The Three Pillar Model
In June 1999, as a means of replacing the 1988 Basel Accord, the first consultative paper (on 
a  new  capital  adequacy  framework)  was  issued  by  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision.  The  First  Consultative  Paper  introduced  the  “three  pillar”  model  which 
comprises  of  “the  minimum capital  requirements”  – that  attempt  to  consolidate  the  rules 
established in the 1988 Accord, “supervisory review” and “market discipline” – “as a lever to 
strengthen  disclosure  and  encourage  safe  and  sound  banking  practices”.12 Whilst 
acknowledging that the 1988 Accord had “helped to strengthen the soundness and stability of 
the international  banking system and enhanced competitive equality among internationally 
active banks”, it was added that the new framework provided by the first consultative paper 
was  “designed  to  better  align  regulatory  capital  requirements  to  underlying  risks  and  to 
recognise the improvements to risk measurement13 and control.“
One of the flaws inherent in the 1988 Basel Accord was namely,  the fact that it rewarded 
risky lending since it required banks to set aside the same amount of capital against loans to 
shaky  borrowers  as  against  those  with  better  credits.14 Apart  from  the  fact  that  capital 
requirements  were  just  reasonably  related  to  bank’s  risk  taking,  the  credit  exposure 
requirement was the same regardless of the credit rating of the borrower.15 Furthermore, the 
capital requirement for credit exposure often depended on the exposure’s legal form – for 
instance, an on-balance sheet loan was generally subject to a higher capital requirement than 
an off-balance sheet to the same borrower.16 In addition to such insensitivity to risk, another 




10Ibid at page 4
11Ibid at pages 4 and 5
12See ‚Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework“ June 1999 < 
http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> 
13See remarks of the chairman of the Task Force on the Future of Capital regulation; ibid  
14„Basle bust“ The Economist April 13th 2000  
15M Saidenberg and T Schuermann,‚The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research (2003) Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4  
16ibid
II. Capital Arbitrage
A general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. This is 
attributed  to  its  wide  risk  categories  which  provide  banks  with  the  liberty  to  “arbitrage 
between  their  economic  assessment  of  risk  and  the  regulatory  capital  requirements.”17 
“Regulatory capital arbitrage” involves the practice by banks of “using securitisation to alter 
the profile of their book and may produce the effect of making the bank’s capital ratios appear 
inflated.18  Such a practice justifies the need for regulation to be extended to (and consolidated 
within) the securities markets – and not merely confined to the field of banking.
Four principal types of identified capital arbitrage include:19cherry picking, securitisation with 
partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit. 
III. Basel II 
Some of the key factors which instigated the introduction of Basel 2 include:20 
− „Changes  in  the  structure  of  capital  markets  –  resulting  in  the  need  for  the 
incorporation of increased competitiveness of credit markets in capital requirements
− The  need  for  measures  which  would  facilitate  the  eradication  of  inefficiencies  in 
lending markets 
− Explosive debt levels which were generated during the economic upturn.“
Under Basel II, and in response to the fact that the measurement of minimum capital was 
previously based on a general  assessment  of  risk dispersion which did not  correspond to 
specific circumstances of individual institutions, credit institutions will be required to retain 
more  capital  if  required.  Under  Pillar  1,  the  definition  of  capital  and  minimum  capital 
coefficient remain unchanged – however, credit institutions will be required to retain more 
capital if their individual risk situation so demands.21 Further advancements under Basel II are 
illustrated in the areas of risk measurements. The measurement methods for credit risk are 
more sophisticated than was previously the case. For the first time, a means of measuring 
operational risk has been set out.22 Under Pillar One, credit and market risk are supplemented 
by operational risk – which is to be corroborated by capital.23 
17‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord’ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21  
18ibid; Bank’s capital ratio may appear inflated “relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure”, see ibid 
19See ibid at pages 22-24  
20See A Saunders and L Allen, ‘Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other 
Paradigms’ Second Edition Wiley Publishers at page 24  




B. Basel  Committee's  Proposals  to  Strengthen  Global  Capital  and  Liquidity  
Regulations
I. Objectives  of  the  Basel  Committee's  Proposals  to  Strengthen  Global  Capital  and  
Liquidity Regulations24
- “As  well  as  strengthening  global  capital  and  liquidity  regulations  (which  would 
ultimately facilitate a more resilient banking sector), the Basel Committee’s reforms 
are  aimed towards improving  the banking sector’s  ability  to absorb shocks arising 
from  financial  and  economic  stress  –  hence  mitigating  spill  over  risks  from  the 
financial sector to the real economy.
- The Committee  is  also striving towards the improvement  of  risk management  and 
governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. “
II. Key elements of the Basel Committee’s proposals
1) The quality, consistency, and transparency of capital base will be raised to ensure that 
large, internationally active banks are in a better position to absorb losses on both a 
going  concern  and  gone  concern  basis.  (For  example,  under  the  current  Basel 
Committee standard, banks could hold as little as 2% common equity to risk-based 
assets, before the application of key regulatory adjustments).
 - As well as recommending an increase in the quality, consistency and transparency of capital 
base25,  the  Basel  Committee’s  recognition  of  the  fact  that  “insufficient  detail  on  the 
components of capital”26 render “accurate assessment of its quality or a meaning comparison 
with  other  banks  difficult”,  infers  its  acknowledgement  of  the  importance  attributed  to 
enhanced disclosures. Furthermore, the increased importance attached to the role of central 
counter parties in efforts aimed at reducing systemic risks should also facilitate the process of 
achieving greater and more enhanced disclosures.
2) The risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. In addition to the 
trading  book  and  securitisation  reforms  announced  in  July  2009,  the  Committee 
proposes  the  consolidation  of  the  capital  requirements  for  counterparty  credit  risk 
exposures  arising  from  derivatives  and  securities  financing  activities.  These 
enhancements  are  aimed  at  strengthening  the  resilience  of  individual  banking 
institutions and reducing the risk of shocks being transmitted from one institution to 
another  through  the  derivatives  and  financing  channel.  Consolidated  counterparty 
capital requirements should increase incentives to transfer OTC derivative exposures 
to central counterparties and exchanges. 
However there is also a limit to what the capital framework could address. As highlighted by 
the recent crisis, capital requirements on their own, were insufficient in addressing liquidity 
and funding problems which arose during the crisis. The importance of enhanced disclosures 
is  also reflected  and embodied within the Committee's  second objective  in relation  to its 
proposal to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector, that is, its endeavours “to improve 
risk management and governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.”
24See Bank For International Settlements, 'Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector' Consultative 
Document, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision December 2009 at page 1
25 See first key element of the proposals being issued by the Basel Committee.
26 See Consultative Document of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the Resilience of 
the Banking Sector” December 2009 at page 13 
As a result of the inability of bank capital adequacy requirements, on their own, to address 
funding and liquidity problems27, the need to focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market 
discipline,  is  growing more  apparent.  There  is  growing justification  for  greater  measures 
aimed at extending capital rules to the securities markets. This not only arises from increased 
conglomeration and globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, 
but also the fact that „the globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors 
and  capital  seeking  companies  to  switch  to  lightly  regulated  or  completely  unregulated 
markets.“28 Furthermore, it is not only argued that „the fact that many banks in a number of 
countries have chosen to securitise assets is probably largely due to the capital requirements 
imposed on them“, but also that present rules do not „explicitly cover risks other than credit 
and market risk“.29
The engagement of market participants in the corporate reporting process, a process which 
would consequently  enhance  market  discipline,  constitutes  a  fundamental  means  whereby 
greater  measures  aimed  at  facilitating  prudential  supervision,  could  be  extended  to  the 
securities markets. Through Pillar 3, market participants like credit agencies can determine 
the levels  of capital  retained by banks – hence their potential  to rectify or exacerbate pro 
cyclical effects resulting from Pillars 1 and 2. The challenges encountered by Pillars 1 and 2 
in addressing credit risk is reflected by problems identified with pro cyclicality,  which are 
attributed to banks’ extremely sensitive internal credit risk models, and the level of capital 
buffers which should be retained under Pillar Two. Such issues justify the need to give greater 
prominence to Pillar 3.
As a result of the influence and potential of market participants in determining capital levels, 
such market participants are able to assist regulators in managing more effectively, the impact 
of  systemic  risks  which  occur  when  lending  criteria  is  tightened  owing  to  Basel  II's 
procyclical  effects.  Regulators are able  to respond and to manage with greater  efficiency, 
systemic risks to the financial system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged 
become reluctant to lend. This being particularly the case when such firms decide to cut back 
on lending activities, and the decisions of such firms cannot be justified in situations where 
such  firms’  credit  risk models  are  extremely  sensitive  –  hence  the  level  of  capital  being 
retained is actually much higher than minimum regulatory Basel capital requirements.30
The  European  Central  Bank’s  report  on  “Credit  Default  Swaps  and Counter  Party  Risk” 
identifies  asymmetrical  information  as  constituting  a  challenge  for  non-dealer  market 
participants  since  in  its  view,  price  information  is  currently  limited,  as  dealer  prices  are 
typically  set  on  a  bilateral  basis  and  are  not  available  to  non-dealers.31 Furthermore,  the 
Report also identifies the role played by credit default swaps in the recent financial crises, 
27 See M Ojo, 'Extending the Scope of Prudential Supervision: Regulatory Developments During and Beyond the 
'Effective' Periods of the Post BCCI and the Capital Requirements Directives' (January 2010), forthcoming in the 
Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics. 
28 See Deutsche Bundesbank , „Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche Bundesbank 
Monthly Report January 2006 at page 41
29Regulation, it is further argued, „may also impact on the relationship between banks and the securities market as a 
source of finance. So long as the banks are required to set aside 8% capital for loans to the financially soundest 
companies, direct borrowing in securities markets will probably be a cheaper form of funding for these companies“. 
See „Basel Committee’s Proposal for a New Capital Adequacy  Framework“http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____15120.aspx  For further information on this see M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and 
Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“ (2010)
30For further information on this, see M Ojo, ' Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive: Responding to 
the 2008/09 Financial Crisis' (2009)
31 „Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk“ European Central Bank 2009 at page 62
highlights the contribution of counter risk management in the collapse of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers, and also the challenges relating to the management of counter party risk 
exposures which arise from Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and other (“over the counter”)OTC 
derivatives.32
Furthermore, the ECB recently highlighted that “no disclosure requirements currently exist 
within the IASB accounting standards with respect to the main counterparts  for derivative 
transactions.” Further, it states that “added disclosures for large counter parties and those that 
exceed certain  thresholds would be useful in order to enable  market  participants  to better 
assess their counterparty33 risk and the potential for systemic spill over effects.”
3) The Basel Committee will introduce a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to 
the Basel II risk based framework with a view to changing to a Pillar  1 treatment 
based on appropriate review and calibration. This should help to contain the build up 
of excessive leverage in the banking system, introduce additional safeguards against 
attempts to “game” the risk based requirements, and help address model risk. In order 
to  ensure  comparability,  the  details  of  the  leverage  ratio  are  to  be  harmonised 
internationally. – making full adjustments for residual accounting differences. 
4) The Committee will introduce a series of measures aimed at promoting the build up of 
capital  buffers during good times – which could be drawn upon during periods of 
stress. A counter cyclical capital framework will contribute to a more stable banking 
system which will help dampen, instead of amplify, economic and financial shocks. In 
addition the Committee will be promoting a more forward looking provisioning which 
is based on expected losses, and which captures actual losses with greater transparency 
and  which  is  also  less  pro  cyclical  than  the  present  model  (the  “incurred  loss” 
provisioning model).
As  was  highlighted  under  the  introductory  section,  the  promotion  of  financial  stability 
through  more  risk  sensitive  capital  requirements,  constitutes  one  of  Basel  II’s  primary 
objectives.34 However some problems identified with Basel II are attributed to pro cyclicality 
and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the trading book are adequately accounted 
for in the current capital requirements.35 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II has been criticised 
since “capital requirements for credit risk as a probability of default of an exposure decreases 
in the economic upswing and increases during the downturn”36 – hence resulting in capital 
requirements which fluctuate over the cycle. Other identified37 consequential effects include 
the fact that fluctuations in such capital requirements may result in credit institutions raising 
their capital during periods when its is costlyfor them to implement such a rise – which has 
the  potential  of  inducing  banks  to  cut  back  on  their  lending.  It  is  concluded  that  “risk 
32  ibid at page 36
33Private sector financial institutions
34For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies. < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 
of 47
35See ibid at page 23 of 47
36See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies. <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 of 
47
37As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies. 
See page 46 of 47
sensitive capital requirements should have pro cyclical effects principally on undercapitalised 
banks.”38
According to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an earlier recognition of loan losses, which 
could have been facilitated by relevant disclosures about loan loss provisioning, could have 
reduced pro cyclical effects which occurred during the recent crisis.39 Not only does the FSF 
propose that amendments be made to the Basel II framework - amendments which are aimed 
at reducing banks’ disincentives to increase their level of provisions for loan losses, it is also 
of the opinion that measures aimed at improving market discipline could also help in reducing 
procyclicality and diversity.40 Furthermore, incentives which would encourage banks to retain 
liquidity could be introduced – however , such incentives should be granted whilst striving to 
comply  with  the  aims  and objectives  of  Basel  –  particularly  those  aimed  at  enhancing  a 
regulatory  framework  which  is  more  aligned  with  economic  and  regulatory  capital.  As 
acknowledged by the Basel Committee, „certain incentives which assume the form of capital 
reductions are considered to impose minimum operational standards in recognition that poor 
management of operational risks (including legal risks) could render such risk mitigants of 
effectively little or no value and that although partial mitigation is rewarded, banks will be 
required  to  hold  capital  against  residual  risks”.  Hence  incentives  should  also  adequately 
account for situations where poor management systems may operate in institutions which are 
supposed to have risk mitigants.
As well as drawing attention to the fact that capital  buffers may not actually mitigate the 
cyclical effects of bank regulation,41 regulators are also advised to give due consideration to 
the effects of risk weights on bank portfolio behaviour when implementing regulations.
5) As its fifth proposal, a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active 
banks  is  to  be introduced by the  Committee.  This  will  include  a  30 day liquidity 
coverage ratio requirement which is underpinned by a longer term structural liquidity 
ratio.  The framework will  also incorporate  a common set of monitoring metrics  to 
assist supervisors in their analysis and identification of risk trends . both at the bank 
and  system  wide  level.  Such  standards  and  monitoring  metrics  will  serve  to 
supplement the Basel Committee’s Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management 
and Supervision.
III. Other points highlighted by the Committee
- The review of the need for additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory measures 
aimed at reducing externalities generated by systemically important institutions.
38See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 150
39Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” at pages 20 and 22
40ibid at pages 21 and 22
41See P Agénor and L Pereira da Silva , „Cyclical Effects of Bank Capital Requirements with Imperfect Credit 
Markets“ World Bank Policy Research Paper 5067 at page 36.They illustrate through their model that capital buffers, 
by lowering deposit rates, are actually expansionary and that hence, “if capital buffers are increased during an 
expansion, with the initial objective of being countercyclical, they may actually turn out to be procyclical.” This, in 
their opinion, is an important conclusion, given the prevailing view that “countercyclical regulatory requirements may 
be a way to reduce the build up of systemic risks:if the signaling effects of capital buffers are important, “leaning 
against the wind” may not reduce the amplitude of the financial-business cycle.” For more information on this, also see 
M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“ (2010)
- Recognition that severity of the economic and financial crisis is attributed to the fact 
that  excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage had been accumulated by banking 
sectors  of  many  countries  whilst  many  banks  were  retaining  insufficient  liquidity 
buffers. Consequences resulting from this include the inability of the banking system 
to absorb the resulting systemic trading and credit losses . Further, the banking system 
was unable to manage the “re intermediation” of large off balance exposures which 
had accumulated.
- Aggravation of the crisis owing to pro cyclical effects and the interconnectedness of 
systemic institutions – such interconnectedness being triggered by a range of complex 
transactions.
Systemic risks and the central role assumed by banks in relation to liquidity serves as greater
justification  for  regulation  with  respect  to  banks.  “The fundamental  role  of  banks  in  the 
maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently 
vulnerable  to  liquidity  risk,  both  of  an  institution-specific  nature  and  that  which  affects 
markets as a whole.“42
In relation to the securities markets, information asymmetry appears to constitute a greater 
basis  for  regulation.  However,  the  existence  of  information  asymmetry  within  the 
banking43sector  has the potential  to  generate  systemic  effects  within  the banking sector  – 
consequences whose effects, it could be said, could have greater repercussions than if such 
were to originate from within the securities markets.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability 
Review, is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge44 which banks have about their 
borrowers and the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”45 The importance of the link 
between liquidity risks and systemic risks within the banking sector is  highlighted by the 
consequences  attributed  to  the  reluctance  of  banks  to  retain  liquidity  -  given  the  cost  of 
holding liquidity.46 The consequential shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance 
sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the importance of the role assumed by central banks in 
the funding of bank balance sheets.47
42Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
43 According to the Bundesbank, „the economics of information, which is widely applicable to the financial markets, 
therefore eases the rigorous assumptions about information requirements and market perfection.“ See Deutsche 
Bundesbank , „Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report 
January 2006 at page 36
44Since specific knowledge which banks possess about their borrowers is considered to be a factor which determines 
the illiquidity of bank loans; see “The Concept of Systemic Risk” ECB Financial Stability Review December 2009 at 
page 137<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?05d3164914c6a14bb13522 
2b5c3894fa>
45ibid; According to the Review, the reduction in the common pool of liquidity also has the potential to trigger the 
failure of banks and could consequently lead to a devaluation of illiquid bank assets and further aggravation of 
problems within the banking sector.
46Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24
47ibid
1. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
According to a report,48 the two principal solutions which have been endorsed by the Turner 
Review and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce 
pro cyclical effects49 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks 
“hold bigger reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good 
times and storing up capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a 
range of assets because this also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's procyclical effects 
–  as  illustrated  through  the  “amplification  of  business  cycle  fluctuations”,  involves  the 
utilisation of a “business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing 
in the rate of growth of the GDP”. Under such a scheme, it is argued, riskier “banks would 
face  higher  capital  requirements  without  regulation  exacerbating  credit  bubbles  and 
crunches.”50
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within the 
capital requirements framework include:51
− The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based 
on long data series,  technical  adjustments  made to the risk weight  function,  stress 
testing  requirements  and  Pillar  2  supervisory  review process.  It  is  acknowledged, 
however, that more measures may be required to mitigate the procyclical effects of the 
capital requirements framework. Options provided include those aimed at reducing its 
cyclical risk sensitivity, measures which enhance its risk capture, and the intentional 
introduction of counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or provisions). 
2. Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Procyclicality 
In its report52 on “Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System”, the Financial Stability 
Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify procyclicality was extended 
to three areas:53
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and valuation
issues. 
48The Turner Review :Key Elements of the Turner Review (page 2 of 4) <http://www.dlapiper.com>
49Exacerbated strains on bank capital is the term used to denote procyclicality ; see ibid International Accounting 
Standards are also considered to have had a pro-cyclical impact. It is stated that “in particular moving to marking 
to market accounting, rather than the more traditional marking to maturity, exacerbated volatility in the accounts 
of banks – with valuation becoming practically impossible for some securities as the market in them 
disappeared.”;  ibid
50R Repullo, J Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte, “How to Mitigate the Procyclical Effects of Capital Adequacy 
Rules” <http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5ff0e4ba595.0.html>
51See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf Page 46 of 
47
52 “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
53Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf page 46 of 47
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the 
Financial Stability Forum is as follows:54
• That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the 
regulatory capital framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking 
system increase during strong economic conditions and can be drawn down during 
periods of economic and financial stress;
• That the BCBS should revise the market risk framework of Basel II to reduce the 
reliance on cyclical VAR-based capital estimates;
• The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, non-
risk based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and 
put a floor under the Basel II framework;
• Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices as a 
critical part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy of 
banks’ capital buffers above the minimum regulatory capital requirement;
That the BCBS should monitor the impact of the Basel II framework and make 
appropriate adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital 
requirements;
That the BCBS carry out regular assessments of the risk coverage of the capital 
framework in relation to financial developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles and make 
timely enhancements.
3. Risk Management and Governance
“Stress  testing is  an important  risk management  tool  – particularly  for counter  party  risk 
management.”55 
According to the Basel Committee,56 “ as public disclosure increases certainty in the market, 
improves transparency, facilitates valuation, and strengthens market discipline, it is important 
that banks publicly disclose information on a regular basis that enables market participants to 
make informed decisions about the soundness of their liquidity risk management framework 
and liquidity position.” The involvement of market participants in the process whereby the 
Committee  strives  to  facilitate  market  discipline  through  the  development  of  “a  set  of 
disclosure requirements which will  allow such market  participants  to assess key pieces of 
information on the scope of application, capital,  risk exposures, risk assessment processes, 
and hence capital adequacy of an institution“57 constitutes a vital means whereby effective 
corporate governance could be facilitated.
54 See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” at pages 2 
and 3 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf
55 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document „Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking 
Sector“ at page 48
56See Bank for International Settlements „Proposed Enhancements to the Basel II Framework: Revisions to Pillar 
3“ (Market Discipline)“ Consultative Document , Basel Committee on Banking Supervision paragraph 73 at 
page 23
57See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications July 
2009 at page 29 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf and < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf?noframes=1>
Recent reports have revealed the lack of knowledge demonstrated by financial institutions in 
relation to risks involved when engaged with “businesses and structured credit products.”58 
The fact that banks “did not adhere to the fundamental tenets of sound financial judgement 
and prudent risk management” was also highlighted.59
Greater efforts have been undertaken to involve market participants by encouraging them to 
assess a bank’s risk profile. Such proactive efforts are more desirable than “allowing markets 
to  evolve  and  decide.”60 As  identified  by  the  Basel  Committee,  “improvements  in  risk 
management must evolve to keep pace with rapid financial innovation.61 Furthermore, it states 
that  “  this  is  particularly  relevant  for  participants  in  evolving  and  rapidly  growing 
businesses.62 Innovation has increased the complexity and potential illiquidity of structured 
credit products – which in turn, could make such products not only more difficult to value and 
hedge, but also lead to inadvertent increases in overall risk.”63 “Further, the increased growth 
of complex investor specific products may result in thin markets  that  are illiquid – which 
could expose a bank to large losses in times of stress, if  the associated risks are not well 
understood and managed in a timely and effective manner. Stress tests have been identified as 
means  whereby investors’  uncertainty about  the  quality  of  bank balance  sheets,  could be 
eliminated.64
The Committee's acknowledgement of negative incentives arising from the use of external 
ratings to determine regulatory capital requirements and proposals to mitigate these incentives 
65 is well - founded – however, regulators will also be able to manage, with greater ability, 
systemic  risks  to  the  financial  system during  such  periods  when  firms  which  are  highly 
leveraged  become reluctant  to  lend  where  more  market  participants  such  as  credit  rating 
agencies, could be engaged in the supervisory process.66 The Annex to Pro cyclicality in the 
Accompanying  Document  amending  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive67 not  only 
importantly emphasises the fact that regulatory capital requirements do not constitute the sole 
determinants of how much capital banks should hold, but also highlights the role of credit 
rating agencies in compelling banks to increase their capital levels even where such institution 
may be complying with regulatory requirements.
58Ibid at page 10
59ibid
60See B Arrunada, “The Provision of Non Audit Services by Auditors: Let the Market Evolve and Decide” 1999 
International Review of Law and Economics at page 13. According to Arrunada, regulators should not only 
focus on policies which would improve transparency of information – hence enhancing market incentives, but 
should strive towards fostering a greater level of competition. Markets, in his opinion, should be the “driving 
force behind the evolution of the industry” – since regulators are not well equipped with the necessary 
knowledge and proper incentives which are required for defining an efficient market framework.
61 See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications July 
2009 at page 12
62ibid
63ibid
64See “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses” Section 3.2.1’ Crisis Resolution 
Policies: Stress Testing of Banks” http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/thematic_articles/article15893_en.htm It 
is also highlighted in the report that stress tests could serve as “decisive tools in accomplishing this task since 
they provide information about banks’ resilience and ability to absorb possible shocks.”
65 See  Consultative Document of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the Resilience 
of the Banking Sector” December 2009at page 55
66See M Ojo, ' 'Extending the Scope of Prudential Supervision: Regulatory Developments During and Beyond 
the 'Effective' Periods of the Post BCCI and the Capital Requirements Directives' (January 2010), forthcoming in 
the Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics. 
67Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.< 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47
Further as rightly acknowledged by the Committee, “recent experience has shown that banks’ 
internal credit models have not performed well. Permitting banks to use their own internal 
models  to  estimate  the  capital  requirements  for  securitisation  exposures  could  increase 
pressure to permit the use of such models in Basel II more broadly. Thus, while there have 
been concerns  expressed about  the use of  external  ratings  under  the Basel  II  framework, 
including that reliance on external ratings could undermine incentives to conduct independent 
internal assessments of the credit quality of exposures, the removal of external ratings from 
the  Basel  II  framework  could  raise  additional  issues  for  determining  regulatory  capital 
requirements.“68
C. Conclusion
As well  as  the  inability  of  bank capital  adequacy requirements,  on their  own,  to  address 
funding and liquidity problems, the need for greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, 
market  discipline, and growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending capital 
rules to the securities markets, are factors which are becoming more apparent. 
Even though markets should be allowed to evolve, checks and controls should exist to ensure 
that such market activities are effectively managed and controlled. Management information 
systems (MIS) and banks’ credit risk models should be flexible (and not overly sensitive) in 
order to adapt to the evolving market whilst providing for some element of control. The Basel 
Committee furthermore, acknowledges the role assumed by management information systems 
and risk management processes in assisting the bank “to identify and aggregate similar risk 
exposures across the firm, including legal entities, and asset types (eg loans, derivatives and 
structured products).”69
The operation of risk mitigants in bank institutions does not justify a reduction in the capital 
levels to be retained by such banks – since banks operating with risk mitigants could still be 
considered  inefficient  operators  of  their  management  information  systems  (MIS),  internal 
control systems, and risk management processes. The fact that banks possess risk mitigants 
does not necessarily imply that they are complying with Basel Core Principles for effective 
supervision (particularly Core Principles 7 and 17). Core Principle 7 not only stipulates that 
“banks and banking groups satisfy supervisory requirements of a comprehensive management 
process, ensure that this identifies, evaluates, monitors and controls or mitigates all material 
risks and assesses their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile, but that such 
processes correspond to the size and complexity of the institution.” Certain incentives which 
assume the form of capital  reductions are considered by the Basel Committee to “impose 
68 See  Consultative Document of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Strengthening the Resilience 
of the Banking Sector” December 2009 paragraph 185 at page 56; for further information on the strengths and 
weaknesses of banks' internal credit models, also see M Ojo, 'The Responsive Approach by the Basel Committee 
(on Banking Supervision) to Regulation: Meta Risk Regulation, the Internal Ratings Based Approaches and the 
Advanced Measurement Approaches (2009)http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16752/ and 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447446
69See „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision publications July 
2009 paragraph 29 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf?noframes=1> at page 16.The Basel Committee 
attributes the increased likelihood that different sectors of a bank are exposed to a common set of products, risk 
factors or counter parties, to the growth of market based intermediation.
minimum operational  standards  in  recognition  that  poor  management  of  operational  risks 
(including legal risks) could render such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that 
although partial mitigation is rewarded, banks will be required to hold capital against residual 
risks”.
Information disclosure should be encouraged for several reasons, amongst which include the 
fact that imperfect information is considered to be a cause of market failure – which “reduces 
the  maximisation  potential  of  regulatory  competition”,  and  also  because  disclosure 
requirements  would  contribute  to  the  reduction  of  risks  which  could  be  generated  when 
granting reduced capital level rewards to banks who may have poor management systems.
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